如想要以我們所希望的方式來取得我們想要的專利權，在向美國專利商標局進行專利申請時，就必須將許多不同的面向納入考量。專利局已經建立一些鼓勵機制與防範措施，或者是實質否決權，試圖引導專利申請人與代理人採取某些決定方案，或是以某種方式來進行專利申請。一般來說，這些是為了加快申請速度並減少專利局申請案之積案。任何人在檢視歐洲專利局或美國專利商標局之收費表時，這些鼓勵機制與防範措施，都可以在取得核准專利之整體成本上，導致顯著的差異。因此，本文的重點是要突顯另一個應該要加以考量的面向 —— 專利局對審查委員採取之鼓勵機制。

關於這一點，可以藉由美國專利商標局針對於RCE積案所採取的方案為範例來說明。

基於審查委員在美國專利商標局的職位，審查委員必須要取得「審查點數」來佐證其之工作內容。在幾乎所有的情況下，所需要達到之審查點數為40小時/週，但是針對於較為複雜的技術領域，在同樣的時間內所需要達到的審查點數則較少。美國專利商標局在每件專利申請案中，都可以取得2小時之點數：在發出「首次審查意見書」（1stOA）時有1.25小時之點數，而在發出「核准通知書」時則有0.75小時點數，或者在發出「放棄申請聲明書」時也有0.75小時點數。這意味著審查委員係被鼓勵發出1stOA，也被鼓勵發出核准通知書。而放棄申請這件事則完全取決於申請人本身的動機，而不是審查委員所能掌控的。

審查委員在後續之「非最終審查意見書」（Non-Final Office Actions）、「最終審查意見書」（Final OA）與「諮詢意見書」（Advisory Actions），並不能取得任何點數。審查委員並未被鼓勵發出這些聲明的事實，可能有助於申請人瞭解為什麼審查委員，並不太願意發出諮詢意見書或是後續的非最終審查意見書。

但是，審查委員為什麼接下來又會被鼓勵發出「核准通知書」，而不是「最終審查意見書」（分別為0.75比上0小時點數）？其原因在於，美國專利商標局在該系統的其他部分中，建立了控制措施與查核點，來檢查審查委員是否只是為了獲得更多小時點數，便草率准予專利權。在某些情況下，審查委員將會被要求向上級說明他們的核准理由，而如果他們犯了錯，後果對他們來說可能就會是很嚴重的。

在專利申請人並未參與其中的前提下，審查委員的動機又將會如何影響申請人一事，可以透過美國專利商標局對於RCE積案之做法來進行觀察。在申請人並不知曉的情況下，在2010-2013年期間，於審查委員發出Final OA之後，申請人通常可以選擇以下在三種方式中之一者，來續行其之專利申請：延續審查請求（RCE）、延續申請請求（CA）、或是提出由專利審理暨訴願委員會（PTAB）來進行複審之請願書。我們在此將忽略提出複審請願書的部分，因為這與以下範例並不是真正相關的，並且僅適用於人們並不希望進行一般審查程序的情況下。

2010年美國專利商標局留意到，在美國專利商標局中待審之RCE案的數量略有增加。在 2011年，提出RCE案的成本係比起提出CA案還要來得低。當時的美國專利商標局局長Kappos，試圖透過改變對美國專利商標局審查委員的鼓勵機制，來減少RCE案的數量。他將首次RCE的小時點數由2小時減為1.75小時（1.0+0.75），並將後續的RCE減為1.5小時（0.75+0.75）。屬於獨立申請案之CA案，則仍維持在首次申請案的2小時點數。他還允許審查委員延後對於RCE案的審查，而不直接進行處罰。當時的想法是，藉著讓審查委員在審查RCE案時所獲得的利益較少，而鼓勵審查委員接受CA申請案。這項方案因為鼓勵機制都是內部的引導方案，而獲致顯著的失敗。在這項方案中對於阻卻專利審查委員，以及阻卻專利申請人之間等等方面顯然是脫鉤的。專利審查委員係被鼓勵接受CA案，然而專利申請人卻持續申請RCE，而只有對於具時效性的申請案才會提出CA案，主要的考量都是因為費用上的差異。在這段期間所提出的RCE案都會被忽略並仍然維持未審決，這不但損害了專利申請人與專利局之利益，也只增加了積案數量，並導致在2011-2013年期間，RCE的積案增加了大約6倍。

美國專利商標局在2013年，將RCE和CA之間的小時點數改為相同價值，並同時藉著讓第二次RCE調整為比提出CA案更為昂貴（CA案費用為1,600美元，RCE案為1,700美元），來回復審查委員的鼓勵機制。然而，在這種作法下仍然出現一個有趣的面向——審查委員對於RCE案有一些特定排案時程。如果審查委員擁有5件或更少RCE案，則上述所討論與小時點數有關的鼓勵機制，可能仍然是適用的。在這種情況下，該審查委員審查RCE案的動機並不與申請人相等，這意味著RCE案仍然會被忽略。由於排案數量並不是公開資訊，與審查委員討論他自己/該技術領域單位，對於CA案和RCE案的處理方式為何，以分辨他們的鼓勵措施，對於讓申請人得以在獲得相關資訊後再據以作出決定而言，仍然會是有價值的。美國專利商標局還另外推出了新的方案，來協助緩解RCE積案情況，例如最終審查意見書後的再考量試行計畫（After Final Consideration Pilot program）。

上述與RCE案有關的故事，舉例說明瞭解審查委員被鼓勵如何進行專利申請案審查之優點。如果人們在2011-2013年期間提出較CA案更為便宜之RCE案的話，美國專利商標局審查委員就有可能因為鼓勵機制與申請人不同，而傾向於讓RCE案維持未審決較長的時間。目前，這種的鼓勵機制是較為難以理解的，因為其係依據待處理排案量（5件RCE或更少）而定，並且這樣的資訊並不是公開的，但是這會導致另一個更為概要結論——為了要確保專利申請人的選擇會與審查委員的動機一致，理解專利局的運作方式就會是很重要的，而這就是雇用經驗豐富的專利從業人員所能提供的協助。

作者： 郭史蒂夫 歐洲專利律師 現任： 北美智權教育訓練處 ／歐洲專利律師 經歷： Bryers事務所 歐洲專利律師 Bugnion SpA事務所 歐洲專利學習律師 Notabartolo & Gervasi事務所 歐洲專利學習律師 歐洲專利局 實習生 英國牛津大學生物化學、細胞與分子生物系，生化碩士 英國倫敦大學瑪莉皇后學院，智財管理碩士

Consideration about patent office incentive systems
Stefano John NAIP Education & Training Group / European Patent Attorney

When prosecuting a patent application before the patent office, one has to take into account of many different aspects to obtain what one wants and in the manner one wants. The patent office sets up incentives and deterrents, or actual vetoes, to try and direct patent applicants and agents in taking certain decisions or prosecuting their application in a certain manner. Generally this is done to expedite prosecution and reduce patent office application backlogs. As anybody who has looked at fee sheets for the EPO or USPTO, the incentives or deterrents can make a notable difference to the overall cost of obtaining a granted patent. The point of this article is to highlight another aspect which should be taken into consideration – the incentives applied by the patent office to examiners themselves.

This can be done by using the example of the USPTO’s approach to RCE backlogs.

USPTO examiners must obtain counts to justify their position as examiners at the USPTO. In almost all cases, the count is 40 hours/week, though more complex art requires fewer counts over a certain period of time. The USPTO gets 2 hour counts per application: 1.25 hour count for issuing a first Office Action (1stOA) and 0.75 hour count for issuing a notice of allowance or 0.75 hour count for issuing a declaration of application abandonment. This means that the examiner is incentivized to issue a 1stOA, and is also incentivized to issue a notice of allowance. Abandonment depends entirely on the applicant’s own motivations and is out of the examiner’s control.

The examiners get zero hour counts for Subsequent Non-Final Office Actions, Final Office Actions (Final OA) and Advisory Actions. The fact that the examiner is not incentivized to issue such statements may help the applicant understand why the examiner may be less willing to issue an Advisory Action or a Subsequent Non-Final Office Action.

But why would the examiner then be incentivized to issue a notice of allowance and not a Final OA instead (compare 0.75 to 0 hour counts respectively)? The reason is that the USPTO has set up controls and checkpoints in other parts of the system to check that the examiner do not just allow any patent through to obtain more hour counts. In some cases, examiners are asked to justify their allowance to their superiors and the consequences for them can be serious if they are wrong.
How the examiner’s incentives may affect patent applicants if they are not aligned can be seen by the USPTO’s approach to RCE backlogs. In case one is not aware, after an examiner has released a Final OA, in the period of 2010-2013 the Applicant could normally choose to proceed with his patent application in one of 3 ways: Request for Continued Examination (RCE), Continuation Application (CA) or file a petition for review by the PTAB. We will ignore filing a petition for review because it is not really pertinent to the example below and applies to cases where one does not want to proceed with normal prosecution.

In 2010, the USPTO noticed a slight increase in the number of pending RCEs before the USPTO. In 2011, the costs of filing an RCE were cheaper than filing a CA. The director of the USPTO at the time, Kappos, tried to reduce the number of RCEs by changing the incentives to the USPTO examiner. He changed the hour counts for RCEs by reducing them from 2 hour counts to 1.75 for 1st RCE (1.0 + .75) and 1.5 for following RCEs (0.75 + 0.75). CA, as a separate application, would retain the 2 hour count for fist application. He also allowed examiners to delay examining RCEs without direct penalty. The idea was to incentivize examiners to accept CA applications by making examination of RCEs less profitable for the examiner. This failed spectacularly because the incentives were all directed internally. There was a clear disconnect between deterring patent examiners and deterring patent applicants. Patent examiners had been incentivized to accept CA over RCEs while the patent applicants continued filing RCEs, and only filing CA for time-sensitive applications, mainly because of the fee difference. Said filed RCEs would be ignored in this period and remain pending to the detriment of patent applicants and the patent office and only increase the backlog. That is why the backlog of RCEs grew roughly 6 times in the period 2011-2013.

The USPTO in 2013 changed its incentives by restoring the examiner incentive to parity in hour counts between RCEs and CAs and by realigning the fees as well to make 2nd RCEs more expensive than filing CAs ($1700 compared to $1600). However, there is an interesting aspect that still remains – the examiner has specific dockets for their RCEs. If the examiner has 5 or less RCEs, the incentives regarding hour counts discussed above may still kick in again. In which case, the examiner’s incentives to examine a RCE may not be aligned with that of the applicant, which means that the RCE would remain ignored. As docket numbers are not public information, it might be worth discussing with the examiner what his/the art unit’s approach to CA and RCE is to discern their incentives and make your decision once you have such information. The USPTO has also introduced new programs to help alleviate the RCE backlog, such as the After Final Consideration Pilot program.

The above story regarding RCEs is an example of the advantage of understanding how examiners are incentivized to prosecute a patent application. If one filed an RCE in the period 2011-2013, which there were many as they were cheaper than CA, the USPTO examiner was likely to leave it pending for longer as his incentives were different from the applicant’s. At present, such incentive is more difficult to understand because it relies on the pending docket numbers (5 RCE or less) and such information is not public, but this leads to another more general conclusion – to make sure that the patent applicant’s choices are aligned with the examiners’ incentives it is important to understand how patent offices work and this is where using experienced patent practitioners can help.

Author: Stefano John, European Patent Attorney Experiences： European Patent Attorney, Bryers Trainee European Patent Attorney, Bugnion SpA Trainee European Patent Attorney, Notabartolo & Gervasi Internship, EPO

Facebook 按讚馬上加入北美智權報粉絲團