一般來說,如果沒有說明書支持,就不可以對權利要求進行修改。然而,在近期 (2019年7月5日) 的In Re Global IP Holdings一案中,CAFC (美國聯邦上訴法院) 撤銷了PTAB (專利審理暨訴願委員會) 決定、認為即使得不到說明書支持,只要欲擴大之特徵並非此專利的重要技術特徵、同時又具有可預期特性,就可能可以對權利要求進行修改。
然而,專利權人隨後對該專利提出專利更正 (reissue) 程式申請,要求將原獨立項中的「熱塑性塑膠(thermoplastic)」改為更寬泛的「塑膠 (plastic)」,然而此申請最終遭到美國專利局及PTAB所拒絕,理由是通篇說明書及原申請權利要求中都只提到「熱塑性塑膠」,對於更上位的「塑膠」則是隻字未提,「專利說明書向本領域人員表明,發明人僅擁有由特殊的熱塑性塑膠組成的技術手段 (Specification, as a whole, indicates to one skilled in the art that the inventors had possession only of the skins and core comprising specifically thermoplastic)」PTAB於決定中如此說明,因此PTAB最終認定這樣的修改不被說明書支持、拒絕此專利更正申請。隨後專利權人上訴到CAFC。
上訴法院見解
CAFC認為,由於PTAB所採用的認定標準違反了CAFC先前的判例,因此撤銷了PTAB的決定。更詳細的說,PTAB在決定中提到「只要說明書揭露不充分 (就不支持修改),而不論此修改的可預測性、或此修該於整個發明中的重要性 (The Board found that the ’233 patent’s specification was insufficient “regardless of the predictability of results of substituting alternatives, or the actual criticality of thermoplastics in the overall invention”)」。換言之,PTAB認為能不能對權利要求進行修改、僅看說明書對此修改是否充分揭露即可,而無須考慮此修改相對於該領域的可預測性、以及對於此篇專利的重要程度。
然而,CAFC否定了上述PTAB觀點。首先針對可預測性 (predictability),CAFC引用了Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co. (Fed. Cir. 2010,全院聯席審理) 一案的結論:「說明書所需的詳細程度因有關技術的複雜性和可預測性而異」,因此與PTAB的決定相反。CAFC認為能否在說明書未明確支持的前提下修改權利要求請求,應考量可預測性。再來對於重要性(criticality),CAFC引用了 In re Peters (Fed. Cir. 1983) 一案結論,認為「對於未主張的特徵限制、可以與說明書的重要性相關」,也就是說,CAFC認為在說明書未明確支持的前提下能否修改權利要求,還應同時考量此修改對於該發明的重要程度,而由於本案中從「熱塑性塑膠」改為「塑膠」並非發明重點,因此這樣的修改僅是「於權利要求中省略了一項不必要的限制 (merely omit an unnecessary limitation)」。
不知道大家是否認同CAFC於本案中的結論 ?事實上,在網路上是有不認同的觀點存在的,例如《Is the Written Description Requirement a Nose of Wax?》一文中、作者Sandip H. Patel引用了White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47 (1886) 最高法院判決中的段落,認為本案CAFC的判決將導致權利要求的解釋或修改「沒有主見 (a nose of wax)」,也就是權利要求的調整可以無視原說明書揭露內容、而能調整成更大或不同之技術特徵[1]。該文提到,在White v. Dunbar一案判決中,最高法院是拒絕不被說明書支持的擴大修改的,認為權利要求是一項法定要求、其目的是為了使專利權人準確地定義他的發明 (The claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of making the patentee define precisely what his invention is),故只要原說明書中不支持就不應對權利要求給出更寬泛的解釋;另外,該文亦提到最高法院於判決中並沒有提到本案中的兩要素「非重要及可預測性」作為判斷依據。可見得,目前對於是否能擴大修改權利要求還是存在較大的分歧意見。
備註:
White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47 (1886) (“Some persons seem to suppose that a claim in a patent is like a nose of wax which may be turned and twisted in any direction, by merely referring to the specification, so as to make it include something more than, or something different from, what its words express. The context may, undoubtedly, be resorted to, and often is resorted to, for the purpose of better understanding the meaning of the claim; but not for the purpose of changing it, and making it different from what it is. The claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of making the patentee define precisely what his invention is; and it is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import of its terms. This has been so often expressed in the opinions of this court that it is unnecessary to pursue the subject further.”)